Place I 21
Truth Maker/Armstrong: Problem: counterfactual conditionals point to something that does not exist: "counterfactual state" is therefore no truth maker. - There are no counterfactual states - ((s) see below: but there are counterfactual facts (as assumptions). >
Counterfactual conditionals.
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Place II 66
Truth Maker/Counterfactual Conditional/Place: the truthmaker is a special disposition, finite. (Like Goodman, nominalist).
ArmstrongVsPlace:the truthmaker is a law, infinite.
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II (c) 92
Truth Maker/Armstrong: truthmakers are also necessary for the true attribution of unmanifested dispositions - but non-dispositional properties plus laws of nature are sufficient. - E.g., two non-occurring, equally likely events: here there is no fact as truthmaker.
Same case: E.g.s distant elementary particles that never react would behave idiosyncratically: no truth maker, no certain way. Nevertheless: a counterfactual conditional applies: if they had come together, they would have behaved idiosyncratic.
II (c) 99
Laws/Armstrong: Laws are truth makers for law statements. - Atomic state: higher order relation between universals; the number of instantiation is irrelevant. All are identical, therefore F is deducible from a: a is G.
Hume: molecular state: regularity.
Armstrong: here, these many cases only extend the law and do not justify deduction from the unobserved.
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Place III 121
Truth Maker/Armstrong: a single law of nature G makes a universal law statement true and covers all instantiations - PlaceVsArmstrong: individual truth makers necessary.
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Place IV 156
Truth Maker/Place: it is tempting to assume that the state which makes the counterfactual conditional true is the same which makes the causal law statement true from which it is epistemically derived. - (Vs"counterfactual facts").
PlaceVs, Vs"general facts" - VsArmstrong , VsThought-Independent Laws of Nature as Truth Makers -> II 176
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Martin III 175f
Truth maker/MartinVsArmstrong: it is still unclear whether his invocation of laws is strong enough to provide the full ontological weight as truth maker for the solvability of salt that was not put in water.
Martin III 176
Whatever laws he quotes, they seem to be wrong for the situation, namely solely for the situation of the compound, i.e. the actual manifestation.
II 182 f
Absence/Lack/Holes/MartinVsLewis: absence actually is a suitable truth maker: a state.
Problem: a state is merely "general fact" (Russell) (>general term).
David Lewis: "as it is", "how things are" must not simply cover everything that is fulfilled by things, otherwise it is trivial.
Solution/Lewis: truth supervenes on what things there are and what properties and relations they instantiate.
MartinVsLewis: "The way the universe is" is a general term, but still 1st order!
Solution/Martin: reciprocal disposition partnes for mutual manifestation.
Existence theorem/Martin: whether positive or negative: the world is at the other end and not in vain.
