Lexicon of Arguments

 

Graeser I 190
Value/Validation/Lewis: These values ​​should be considered as feeling, believing, desiring - ultimately desire of desire.
HarmanVsLewis: 1) intrinsic desire of a higher level misleading. "Desire" has the meaning of intention and is, just like any intention, already self-referential. >Ethics/Harman.
I 191
FrankfurtVsHarman: risk of blurring the distinction between the goal (s) and the means, and thus committing oneself to the assumption that goals are equipped with means in a certain way and that’s how we come across them.
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Schwarz I 185
Value/ethics/Lewis/Schwarz: values are not inherent in the validated events, but in us. In our wishes - Problem: just because you want something, it’s not necessarily good - Solution: Wishes 2nd stage: desire not to want to smoke - best theory: dispositional - Problem: latent relativism.
Schwarz I 187
LewisVsUtilitarism: neglects perspective.
>Utilitarianism, >Centered world, >Relativism/Lewis, >Desire, >Disposition/Lewis.