Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

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Theses II

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Chalmers I 141
Knowledge/Color researcher Mary/Frank Jackson/Qualia/LycanVsJackson/Lycan/Chalmers: (Lycan 1995)(1): there is a difference in intensionality between "This liquid is water" and "This liquid is H2O". In a way, both sentences express the same fact, but one sentence can be known without knowing the other.
>Intensions, >Intensionality, >Twin Earth, >Implication,
>Stronger/weaker.
Chalmers: these gaps arise because of the difference between primary and secondary intensions (localized or non-localized in the actual or in a possible world).
>Primary Intension, >Secondary Intension, >Possible Worlds, >Actual World.

1. William G. Lycan (1995). A limited defense of phenomenal information". In: Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic. pp. 243--58 (1995)

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