Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


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Theses I
Theses II

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Gadamer I 263
Science/Objectivity/Heidegger/Gadamer: Dilthey's endeavour to make the humanities understandable from life and to take life experience as a starting point had (...) never reached a real balance with the Cartesian concept of science to which he adhered.
>W. Dilthey.
Heidegger, on the other hand, was able to begin quite differently, when (...) Husserl had already made the decline to life a virtually universal working topic and thus left behind the restriction to the question of the methods of the humanities. His analysis of the world of life and the anonymous endowment of meaning that forms the basis of all experience gave the question of objectivity in the humanities a completely new background.
>E. Husserl.
Objectivity/Husserl: [Husserl's analysis] made the concept of objectivity in science appear as a special case.
>Objectivism/Husserl.
Science is anything but a fact to be assumed. The constitution of the scientific world is rather a task in its own right, the task of enlightening the idealization of science. But this task is not the first. In the retreat to the "performing life" (>Life/Husserl) the opposition of nature and spirit proves to be not ultimately valid. Both the humanities and the natural sciences can be derived from the achievements of the intentionality of universal life, that is, from an absolute historicity. This is the understanding in which the self-contemplation of philosophy alone is sufficient.
>Understanding/Heidegger, >Life/Heidegger.
Temporality of Understanding/Heidegger/Gadamer: (...) the mode of knowledge of the natural sciences [becomes] visible as a variation of understanding, "which got lost in the legitimate task of grasping the existing in its intrinsic
Gadamer I 264
incomprehensibility."(1)
Understanding/HeideggerVsDilthey/HeideggerVsHusserl: Understanding (...) is the original form of Dasein, the "being-in-the-world" (...). >Hermeneutics/Heidegger.
Gadamer I 459
Science/Heidegger/Gadamer: It seems to me that Heidegger (...) in "Being and Time" has gained the point of view from which both the difference and the connecting element between Greek and modern science can be thought. When he presented the concept of "Vorhandenheit" (engl. presence-at-hand) as a deficient mode of being and recognized it as the background of classical metaphysics and its continued effect in the concept of subjectivity of modern times, he had followed an ontologically correct connection between the Greek Theoria and modern science.
>Metaphysics, >Subjectivity.
In the horizon of his temporal interpretation of being, classical metaphysics as a whole is an ontology of the existing, and modern science, without suspecting it, is its heir. In the Greek Theoria itself, however, there was certainly something else. Theoria grasps not so much what exists as the thing itself, which still has the dignity of the "thing". That the experience of the thing has as little to do with the mere ascertainability of the pure existence as with the experience of the so-called
I 460
experiential science, was precisely emphasized by the later Heidegger himself(2).
Gadamer: So, like the dignity of the thing, we will also have to keep the objectivity of language free from the prejudice against the ontology of the existing and in one with it from the concept of objectivity.
>Language, >Language/Heidegger.

1. M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit p. 153.
2. Cf. on "das Ding" lectures and essays, pp. 164f. Here the summary of the "Theoria" with the "Science of the Existing" which "Being and Time" had undertaken, is dissolved under the question of the later Heidegger (see also ibid. p. 51 f.). (Cf. also my afterword to M. Heidegger's Kunstwerk-Aufsatz, Stuttgart 1960 (Reclam), pp. 102-125,now in "Heideggers Wege. Studien zum Spätwerk", Tübingen 1983, p. 81-92; Vol. 3 of the Ges. Werke).

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Rorty II 65
Science/Heidegger/Derrida: hard sciences are henchmen of technical progress, no views on the undisguised reality.
Kierkegaard/NietzscheVsPlato, NietzscheVsAristotle: the pursuit of objective truth, not the most rewarding and most human activity.
---
Figal I 107f
Science/Heidegger: "it provides a picture" for acting. There is still "bias" in the orientation to the picture.

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