Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 54
Pointing/McDowell: What we are finally encountering is a content that is still conceivable, and not something that would be more fundamental, namely, a naked pointing or a piece of givenness.
>Content/McDowell, >Perception/McDowell, >Reality, >Concept/McDowell.
We do not stop with our seeing just before the facts (Wittgenstein) we see that something is so and so.
I 64
Pointing/McDowell: we fall victim to the myth of what is given when we assume that the pointing gestures had to break through a boundary which surrounds the sphere of conceivable content.
>Myth of th é given.
I 194
Ostension/Concept/McDowell: E.g. "It looks like this" - does not have to be any less conceptual than what it is a reason for.
>Appearence/McDowell.
We can only get to grips with the rational relationship if we understand it conceptually, even if, according to our theory (Evans), the content would not be conceptual.