Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


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Theses I
Theses II

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Frank I 641f
Other Minds/Mental States/Strawson: one has to be both: self- and external attributor.
Rorty: self-attribution originally based on the same type of observation as attribution.WittgensteinVsRorty: self-attribution without clues.
DavidsonVsRorty: does not show that the attributions with/without clues affect the same entities.
>Other minds, >Self-ascription.

Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica 38 (1984),
101-111
- - -
Strawson I 127
StrawsonVsChisholm indirect attribution of direct attribution.
ChisholmVsStrawson: reversed.
>Attribution/Chisholm, >Self-ascription/Chisholm.
I 141
Attribution/Gap/Strawson: there is no logical gap between self- and external attribution - otherwise depression disappears.
Solution: special character of P predicates: that they can be attributed both to themselves and to others.
>Terminology/Strawson.
I 142
Analogy: Signs on playing cards identify them (criterion), but their meaning for the game goes beyond that - I 144 Difference. Self-attribution not because of observation - but predicates are no solution to the mind-body problem.
>Predicates/Strawson, >Mind body problem.

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