Lexicon of Arguments

 

Wright I, 276
Negation/Logic/Truth/Correctness/correct: If both truth and correctness are involved, there is a distinction between the
A) real, strict negation: it transforms every true or correct sentence into a false or incorrect one, another negation form:
B) Negation: it acts so that a true (or correct) sentence is constructed exactly when its argument does not reach any truth.
>Truth, >Correctness,
Negation/WrightVsBoghossian: the proposition (>Nonfactualism) actually assumes that ""A" is true" should be complementary to the negation of A in the latter sense.
A perfectly reasonable counter-proposal, however, is that A should rather be complementary to the strict concept of the former negation.
Then, in the case that A is merely correct, the valuation of ""A" is true" is also correct and the application of the truth predicate will be generally conservative.
>Conservativity.
WrightVsVs: but there are problems at a different end now: the transition of (i) to (ii): the seemingly unassailable principle that only one sentence with a truth condition can be true would have the form of the conditional:

(II) "A" is true> "A" has a truth condition

I 276/277
And any conservative matrix for ""A" is true" endangers this principle in the case where A is not true but correct.
For then the conservative matrix ""a" is true" is evaluated as correct.
The consequent (II) that "A" has a truth condition (a fact that makes it true) will then probably be incorrect.
>Truth conditions.