Lexicon of Arguments

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Chalmers I 84
Moral/Supervenience/Boyd/Brink/Chalmers: Boyd (1988)(1) and Brink (1989)(2) Thesis: moral facts supervene on natural facts with an a posteriori need. I.e. they supervene in relation to the secondary, not the primary intension of moral concepts. (>Horgan and Timmons, 1992a(3), 1992b(4)).
>Supervenience, >a posteriori necessity, cf. >Morals/Wright.

1. Boyd, R. (1988). How to be a moral realist. In: G. Sayre-McCord (ed.) Essays on Moral Realism. Ithaca, NY: Cornel University Press.
2. Brink, D. (1989). Moral Realism and the foundations of Ethics. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
3. Horgan, T. and M. Timmons (1992). Troubles for new wave moral semantics. The "Open question argument" reviewed. Philosophical Papers
4. Horgan, T. and M. Timmons (1992). Trouble on moral twin earth: Moral queerness revised. Synthese 92: 223-60.

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