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Ethics/Brentano/Moore/Koller: Brentano and Moore converge in amazing ways.
Ethics/Brentano/Moore: The ultimate goal of right action: "the best thing you can do":
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The greatest possible sum of the good which can be attained.
VsMoore/VsBrentano: that does not only assume that we already know what the good is, but also that we can recognize the best among the achievable good.
So that there is something that is intrinsic and recognizable good.
Brentano/Moore: assert for this reason that there is a direct, immediate knowledge of what is good in itself. Immediate evidence.
Good/Ethics/Value/Brentano/Moore: the good is what you should desire and should be taken for good.
Brentano: what it is worth to love it with a love that is properly characterized for its own sake.
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E.g. (Brentano): pleasure, clear insight, knowledge, joy (if it is not joy in the bad), correctness of our judgment and of our emotions, (of our love, hate, and will).
Brentano: Principle of summation (of the good:
1. Something good is better than something bad
2. The existence of good is better than its non-existence
3. A greater good is better than a smaller one.
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Ethics/Value/Good/Moore: Question: What things in isolation are to be considered for good on their own? This also requires the determination of levels of value.
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Method of isolation.
This is why pleasure, taken alone, is of no great value for Moore. Only together with the experience of beautiful things it has a valuable force. This leads to the
Principle of Organic Units: Many things take on quite different properties, depending on the context. (MooreVsBrentano). ((s) "syncategorematic" values.)
MooreVsBrentano: since the inner value is characterized by connecting several simple properties, it can not simply match the sum of its parts.
For example, when no one is aware of a beautiful object, it has no value.
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Method of Isolation/Moore: that are now applied again to recognize the value of such organic units.
Thesis all things that have real value are complex organic entities.
E.g. the joys of human intercourse, enjoying beautiful things.
E.g. Bad: Enjoying ugly things, cruelty, hating the good, etc.
Exception: Pain: is already an evil without any connection to others.
Mixed virtues/Moore: as whole things clearly good, but contain something bad: e.g. courage, compassion, (hating the bad) knowledge of bad or ugly things.
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Acting/ethics/Brentano/Moore: that is sufficient as a basis to answer the question: what action is right?
Of several possibilities for action is only the one right that either produces more or at least not less good things in the world. It is indifferent whether this good is beneficial to the agent himself, or to others.
An action is therefore correct, if it has correct consequences.
Criterion/Ethics/Moore/Brentano: the purpose of doing as much good as possible in the world is then the criterion for correct action.
Judgement: Problem: in regard to this our knowledge is always incomplete.
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Moore/Brentano: therefore ethics cannot provide general rules. We have "rules of medium generality". These then apply in the majority of cases.
Ethics/values/ontology/intrinsic properties/Moore/Brentano/Koller: ontological question: what are the objects of the intrinsic value concepts, on which things can the concepts of the intrinsic good and bad be applied at all? What is the logical structure of these concepts, can the method of isolation always be applied?
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KollerVsBrentano/KollerVsMoore: the questions about the epistemological justification of intrinsic valuations and the question of their suitability for a sustainable foundation of ethics are precisely the questions that make the approach of Brentano and Moore appear doubtful.
Chisholm II = Peter Koller Ethik bei Chisholm in Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986
