Pauen I 22
Intentionality/Brentano/Pauen: this is not about ordinary language "intention"; but the necessary being "about" something.
>
Aboutness.
I 23
Intentionality is inappropriate as an indication of the mental, since not all states of consciousness are intentional by character - E.g. pain. >
Pain.
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Field II 69
Intentionality/Believe/Brentano/Lewis/Field: David Lewis compares the problem with the following about numbers.
E.g. "Many apparent physical properties seem to combine physical and non-physical things - called numbers". For example, what kind of physical relation can a 7-gram heavy stone have to the number 7?". (Similar to Churchland 1979
(1), Dennett 1982
(2), Stalnaker 1984
(3)).
FieldVs: the comparison does not contribute much.
Nominalism: is here a solution: literally there are no numbers, and then also no relations (Field 1980). This allows the use of numbers as a useful fiction. >
Nominalism, >
Fictions.
FieldVs: so viewed, there is no pressure to solve Brentano's problem.
Field II 71
Intentionality/Believe/Brentano/Horwich/FieldVsHorwich: (Horwich (1998)
(4) shows how one can still miss the problem: thesis: according to him "means" and "believes" stand for real relations between people and propositions.
Horwich: but there is no reason to suppose that a physical access receives this relational status:
Definition fallacy of the constitution/Horwich/Field: the (false) assumption that what constitutes relational facts would itself be relational.
Field II 72
Intentionality/Brentano's Problem/Field: his problem is reformulated in our context: how could the having of truth conditions (in representations) be explained naturalistic?
II 259
Reference/indeterminacy/FieldVsBrentano: if reference is indeterminate, we can only accept one naturalistic response, not one of Brentano's of an irreducible mental connection.
1. Paul Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind, Cambridge 1979
2. D. Dennett, "Beyond Belief" in: A: Woodfield (ed.), Truth and Object, Clarendon Press, 1-95
3. R. Stalnaker, Inquiry, Cambridge 1984
1. P. Horwich, Meaning, Oxford 1989
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Prior I 123
Intentionality/Brentano: is a unique logical category. Similar to a relation, without being a real relation.