Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Fodor IV 128
Brentano/Quine: Brentano was right with his thesis about the irreducibility of the intentional to physical states or properties.
(Davidson provides an a priori argument for this (in Mental Events)). But this cannot be mentioned here ((s) in relation to the question of holism) because it has the holism of the intentional as a premise.
Vs: 1. it does not seem that the realism of the intentional is compatible with the Brentano thesis.
But if the intentional is not real, it appears to not matter if content is holistic.
2. If the bearers of meaning are, in the first instance, representations, then the theory of interpretation has no interesting relation to the theory of content.
For, in fact, representations are never the subject of anybody's interpretation.
Interpretation: their actual objects are propositional attitudes, speech acts, etc., not representations.
>Representation, >Content.

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