Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

Table
Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

Concept/Author*  

What is wrong?
Page
Other metadata
Translation
Excerpt or content
Other

Correction: Year / Place / Page
/ /

Correction:
(max 500 charact.)

Your username*
or User-ID

Email address*

The complaint
will not be published.

 
I 86
Physical Laws/Causes/Supervenience/Reduction/Chalmers: Natural laws are not logically supervenient on the physical facts of our world with their spatio-temporal history. There could be another world, indistinguishable from our world, on which other physical laws apply.
>Laws of nature, >Possible worlds, >Indistinguishability, >Twin earth, >Supervenience, cf. >Determinism.
Regularity/Chalmers: on such arguments one can see that causality must be a bit above and independent of regularities (Hume's view of laws and causation: see Lewis 1986b(1), Mackie 1974(2), Skyrms 1980(3).
VsHueme's view: Armstrong 1982(4), Carroll 1994(5), Dretske 1977(6), Molnar 1969(7), Tooley 1977)(8) .. Laws and causality have something irreducible.
I 213/214
Laws/Consciousness/Chalmers: we will need psychophysical laws to explain consciousness together with a underlying physical structure.
I 216
Data: we have at least data about regularities between physical processes and conscious experiences, from which we can conclude the best explanation.
First Person/Chalmers: Problem: with the perspective of the first person, a number of contradictory theories are possible: e.g. Solipsism, panpsychism, etc.
>Regularities.
I 308
Laws/psychophysical laws/Chalmers: some questions need to be answered:
1. If the information space is phenomenologically realized, then why in one way and not in another? E.g. With inverted Qualia?
>Qualia/Chalmers, >Exchanged spectra.
2. Is the nature of the phenomenal information defined by the structure of space?
I 309
How can complex emotional experiences be explained?
>Explanation/Chalmers.
4. What kind of formal structure best captures the structure of phenomenal information?
>Phenomena, >Experience.
5. How can the unity of consciousness within our framework be captured?
>Consciousness/Chalmers.
6. What are the criteria according to which information in my brain corresponds to my conscious experiences?

1. D. Lewis, Philosophical Papers Vol II, New York 1986
2. J. L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe, Oxford 1974
3. B. Skyrms Causal Necessity, New Haven 1980
4. D. M. Armstrong, Metaphysics and supervenience, Critica 42, 1982: pp. 3-17
5. J. W. Caroll, Laws of Nature, Cambridge 1994
6. F. Dretske, Laws of Nature, Philosophy of Science 44, 1977: pp. 248-68
7. G. Molnar, Kneale's argument revisited. Oghilosophical Review 78, 1969: pp. 79-89
8. M. Tooley, The Nature of Laws. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7, 1977: pp. 667-98

Found an error? Use our Complaint Form. Perhaps someone forgot to close a bracket? A page number is wrong?
Help us to improve our lexicon.
However, if you are of a different opinion, as regards the validity of the argument, post your own argument beside the contested one.
The correction will be sent to the contributor of the original entry to get his opinion about.