Lexicon of Arguments

 

Schwarz I 226
Intrinsic properties/Nature/Panpsychism/Panprotopsychism/Chalmers/Schwarz: Chalmers (Chalmers 2002)⁽¹⁾takes advantage of this gap: starting point is a kind.
Def Quidditism: Thesis: Our physical theories describe how physical things and properties behave with each other, what they are, but leave their intrinsic nature in the dark.
>Properties, >Laws of nature, >Naturalism, >Physics,
>Explanation.
Def Pan(proto)psychism: thesis: this intrinsic nature of things and qualities is mental. For example, what we know, from the outside as charge -1, turns out to be a pain from within. ((s) See also > two aspects theory, >Panpsychism.
If our physical vocabulary is rigid (i.e., always refers, in the domain of modal operators, to what plays the causal structural role in us, that is to say pain), then the physical truths necessarily imply the mental, but the implication does not need to be a priori.
>Rigidity, >Reference.
Problem: The physical truths are not sufficient to tell us exactly what situation we are in, especially in regard to the intrinsic nature of the physical quantities.
Cf. >Possible Worlds, >Twin Earth.

1. D. Chalmers [2002]: “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”. In D. Chalmers (Hg.) Philosophy of
Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 247–272