Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

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Theses I
Theses II

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I 12
Psychology/Mind/Descartes/Chalmers: he at least assumed that everything psychological that is worthy of being dale mental has a conscious aspect.
>Mind/Descartes, >Thinking/Descartes, >R. Descartes, >Aspects,
>Dualism.
I 359
Interestingly, Descartes often excluded sensations form the category of the mental, instead assimilating them to the bodily, so not every phenomenal state (at least as I am understanding the notion) would count as mental, either.
>Sensory Impressions/Descartes.
I 13
Psychology/Wilhelm Wundt/Chalmers: Wilhelm Wundt and William James had in a Cartesian way developed psychological theories using introspection to explain behaviour, making phenomenology the arbiter of psychology. They thereby denied psychology as an autonomous domain.
>W. Wundt, >W. James.
I 16
Psychology/Chalmers: I had assigned them to the functional side of the explanation of consciousness. This is where functionalism comes into play.
>Third-person aspects, > Behavior,
>Functionalism.
Phenomenology: On the other hand, there is the phenomenology that deals with the qualities (Qualia): how does consciousness feel, and why is there a way in which consciousness (not self-consciousness) feels.
>First person, >Phenomenology, >Qualia, >Experience, >Knowledge how.
Both sides cannot simply be equated by stipulation.
I 21
Psychology/Explanation/Mind/Qualia/Chalmers: there are no superordinate terms above the separation of the aspects of psychology and phenomenology (behavior and qualia). There seems to be nothing mental, which could be varied independently, if psychological, phenomenal and relational properties are fixed. (Chalmers I 360 Kripke: (1982)(1) Thesis:
the content of beliefs is not determined by psychological and phenomenal properties. ChalmersVs: that is controversial, but that does not mean that the content is something irreducible).
I 22
Psychological/phenomenal: both aspects seem to always appear together.
I 220
Psychology/Consciousness/Chalmers: we had called the psychological side of consciousness awareness. There is a strong coherence between consciousness and awareness.
>Awareness/Chalmers, >Consciousness/Chalmers.
I 221
Problem: there may be some kinds of awarenesses (psychological) which are not based on corresponding experiences (phenomenal). E.g. I am aware of who is President without connecting an experience with it.
Cf. >Knowledge.

1. S. A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rule-Following and Private Language, Cambridge 1982

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