Lexicon of Arguments

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Gadamer I 349
Recognition/Hegel/Gadamer: (...) the dialectical course of the "phenomenology of the spirit" [is] perhaps determined by nothing as decisively as by the problem of the recognition of the "you". To name but a few mile stones in this story: according to Hegel, one's own self-consciousness reaches the truth of one's self-consciousness only through fighting for recognition in the other. The direct relationship between man and woman is the natural recognition of mutual recognition (p. 325)(1). Furthermore, conscience is the spiritual element of recognition, and only through confession and forgiveness can mutual recognition, in which the spirit is absolute, be achieved.
>I-Thou relationship, >Subject-Object problem, >Intersubjectivity,
>Subject/Hegel, >Self-consciousness/Hegel.
Gadamer: It cannot be denied that the interjections of Feuerbach and Kierkegaard are already thought out in these figures of the spirit described by Hegel.

1. A precise interpretation of the dialectics of recognition (Phänomenologie des Geistes IV, A. Selbständigkeit und Unselbständigkeit des Selbstbewusstseins. Herrschaft und Knechtschaft) I have meanwhile published in "Hegels Dialektik. Sechs hermeneutische Studien, Tübingen 1980 (Vol. 3 of the Ges. Werke), Chapter III.

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Bubner I 184
Recognition/Hegel: in the middle between a life saturated with reality and a transparent method lies the "Idea of Recognition", which in its turn disintegrates in the "Idea of Truth" and the "Idea of the Good".
Here, however, there is only the second step, instead of the usual three steps of Hegelian dialectic, because of the elementary subject/object relationship.
The subjective, theoretical concept of the good, in knowledge, is faced with the "Idea of the Good" in practical action.

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Brocker I 793
Recognition/Hegel/HonnethVsHegel/Honneth: Hegel's criticism of Hobbes (see >Hobbes/Hegel, >Intersubjectivity/Hegel) lacks the final step: Hegel criticizes Hobbes' individualistic view of individuals struggling for scarce resources that neglects the simultaneous struggle for intersubjective recognition. Hegel, however, fails to take the decisive step: Hegel's claim to self-realization, which goes beyond the sphere of law, refers to the "moral relationship of the state"(1) as the place of its realization. But this step usually remains stuck in an external representation of the "institutional transformation of the law from an informal to a state-organized relationship (...)".(2)
Brocker I 794
HonnethVsHegel: his interpretation thus lacks the theoretical component of recognition. According to Honneth, the reason for this is Hegel's turn to questions of consciousness theory. Since his real philosophy in Jena, at the latest, Hegel's concept of the state has therefore followed the philosophical logic of consciousness, which increasingly comes to the fore in later writings.
>State/Hegel.


1. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) S. 94
2. Ebenda S. 92f.

Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

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Höffe I 329
Recognition/Phenomenology/Hegel/Höffe: In competition with his or her peers, the human does not first depend on self-assertion, but already on the constitution of a self. Hegel expands the often merely social, legal, or state theoretical
debate on three further topics:
a) confrontation of humans with themselves,
b) confrontation with nature
c) and the three dimensions belonging to the concept of work.
Höffe I 330
Self-consciousness: Self-consciousness appears at first as a simple striving for self-preservation, but encounters the competing striving of another (...) and, since one self-preservation contradicts the other, leads to a "fight to life and death.
The core of this struggle for recognition consists in a "self-knowledge in the other".
a) personal: One recognizes oneself first and only in a second person.
b) apersonal: Self-knowledge is not achieved by social recognition alone. It also requires the examination of the pre- and extra-personal world, which is mediated through work, i.e. economic action.
Social Dimension/Höffe: Mutual recognition, which only succeeds after painful experiences, has an invaluable advantage as soon as it takes on a legal character. (...) the legal mutual recognition does not suffer from scarcity. The status of a legal entity and a citizen is not a scarce commodity; it can be granted to anyone.

1. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, 1807

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