Lexicon of Arguments

 

Schiffer I 152
Epiphanomenalism/Jackson/Schiffer: MaterialismVsEpipenomenalism/MaterialismVsProperties of belief: (Jackson 1982⁽¹⁾, 135): Properties of belief (as epiphenomena) do nothing, they do not explain anything, they only soothe the intuitions of the dualist. It is a mystery how they should fit into science.
>Dualism, >Monism.
JacksonVsMaterialism: pro epiphenomenalism: in terms of mental properties: the critique of materialism rests on an too optimistic view of the animal that the human is, and his abilities.
Epiphenomenalism/Qualia/Jackson: Jackson argues only for Qualia to be epiphenomena.
Materialism/SchifferVsJackson: Materialism only says that it is bad science to assume that things instantiate properties of a certain kind, if one has no coherent representation how and why this should happen.
SchifferVsEpiphenomenalism: deeper problem: if having P has caused having B, then this should be subsumed under a psychophysical extended causal law. At least some mechanism would have to explain the connection between B and P.
I 153
But this does not exist most likely (especially when you consider that it should be possible that different physical states might have B!) And what should be a non-legal mechanism at all?
>Phenomenalism.


1. Jackson, Frank. 1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136