Lexicon of Arguments

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Schwarz I 157
Phenomenon/phenomenal properties/knowledge-how/Lewis/Schwarz: in addition to the fact that there can be independent phenomenal facts next to the physical facts, and besides the zombie intuition this speaks in favour of being able to learn such facts! E.g. Jackson: Mary learns phenomenal facts about colours.
>Colours, >Colour words, >Knowing how, >Phenomena.
Schwarz I 158
Colour explorer Mary/Jackson/Knowledge-how/Lewis/Schwarz: E.g. when she is released, she learns something new: "How it is" to have a red experience.
LewisVs: for him, the gain in knowledge is a problem only if it can really rule out open possibilities with regard to the world. According to Lewis, such possibilities must not exist: the physical facts leave no alternatives open in reference to the world.
No problem is Mary's new information about her own situation in the world. (Lewis pro: 1988e(1), 268ff, 287)
Schwarz: only now she can ask if other people also have this (kind of) experience.
Fact/Mary: It is also unproblematic that she now now internally represents facts that were previously known to her when she acquires new "terms" that were not previously available to her. (Lewis pro: she acquires new forms of representation (1983d(2), 131f)
Mary-Example/Lewis: but this is not an interesting advance in knowledge!
Mary-Example/McMullen, (1985)(3)/Perry (2001)(4): this is essentially indexical and/or demonstrative information.
>Qualia.


1. David Lewis [1988e]: “What Experience Teaches”. Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 13: 29–57.
2. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press
3. Carolyn McMullen [1985]: “‘Knowing what it’s Like’ and the Essential Indexical”. Philosophical
Studies, 48: 211–233
4. John Perry [2001]: Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousnes. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press

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