Lexicon of Arguments

 

Ruth G. Millikan Verschiedene Arten von zweckgerichtetem Verhalten in Dominik Perler, Markus Wild (Hg) Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005

II 212
Animal/Thinking/Belief/propositional content/Millikan: what would really be necessary would not be a translation into Englisch, but an explicit description of the different representation systems that animals actually use.
There are numerous possibilities between the propositional thinking of the human and the absence of any thought.
>World/thinking, >Language and thought, >Animal language, >Representation.
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Millikan I 219
Indefinite Description/Belief Attribution/Millikan: E.g.: "Ralph believes that someone is a spy": this is, of course, ambiguous.
A) directly as indicative by its own type on the belief type that "someone is a spy". That is, Ralph says this in his inner.
B) the dependent sentence "someone is a spy" can be read as a form of belief, with a gap. "___ is a spy".
N.B.: in this reading, Ralph believes of someone that he is a spy ((s) de re).
Moved function: this moves the "someone" to the outside of the sentence.
"He": its moved function is referential in this context.
>Reference, >de re, >de dicto.
I 220
Both readings are about a relation between Ralph and a belief type. In case (b), this type is not completely determined.
>The Ralph case/Quine.