Lexicon of Arguments

 

Gadamer I 415
Truth/Language/Word/Correctness/Plato/Gadamer: Problem: PlatoVsSophists: In misjudging [the] actual truth possibility of speech (which belongs to the essence of falsehood, pseudo, as a counter-possibility) its sophistic abuse arises (...). If the logos is understood as the representation of a thing (deloma), as its disclosure, without fundamentally distinguishing this truth function of speech from the meaningful character of the words, a possibility of confusion inherent to language is opened up. One can then think to have the thing in the word.
Gadamer I 416
Solution/Plato: (...) the truth of things [lies] in speech, i.e., however, lastly, in the meaning of a uniform opinion about things and not in the individual words - not even in the whole inventory of words of a language (...).
>Word/Plato, >Language/Plato, >Correctness/Plato.
It is this misjudgment that enables Socrates to refute the objections of Cratylus, which are so pertinent to the truth of the word, i.e. its meaningfulness. He plays off the use of words against him, i.e. the speech, the logos with his ability to be true and false. The name, the word, seems to be true or false inasmuch as it is used true or false, i.e. it is assigned to the being right or wrong. Such attribution, however, is no longer that of the word, but is already a logos and can find its appropriate expression in such a logos. For example, to call someone "Socrates" assumes that this person is called Socrates.
>Logos/Plato.

- - -
Bubner I 28
Truth/Plato: Reflections on the relationship between speaking and writing: Mediation: Truth can never coincide with the means of its representation.
Truth's constant task of seeking never assured possession (VsSophists).
Bubner: the dialogues are then to read what remains unspoken and hides behind irony, myth, dream, parable.
>Writing/Plato.