I 40
Dialectic/Bubner: neither gadgetry nor ontology: method. It proves itself in its application, for itself it has no sense.
Problem: does one know the application area before, or is it first opened by the method?
So there could be the illusion of a perfect application of the method. The problem is precisely when one understands the dialectic as a method.
I am referring exclusively to Plato and Hegel here. They both agree in terms of the method role.
Hegel: the correct application is proof of the mastery of the method.
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I 54
Dialogue/Bubner: does not come about where the intention of the whole venture is to eliminate the difference by the predetermined identification of the one with the other.
However, this fundamental equality of truth interests is nowhere present in Hegel's phenomenology.
It does without the clear separation from the thing itself and external reflection as it prevails in logic.
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I 57
Dialectics/today/Bubner: today is hardly regarded as the highest form of science, rather in the form of questions of belief; one searches for its value where scientific precision is not sufficient.
But this does not detract from the epochal importance of Hegel.
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I 59
Logic/dialectics/Hegel: "The course of the thing itself".
He is the Absolute not against the finite, and under the oppression of its concretion, but so as to produce the concretion from itself. Without the help of others, he conveys the abstract generality of the conceptual nature with all the wealth of the content of interest to the theory.
The essential point is that the method finds and recognizes the determination of the universal within itself.
The absolute method is not an external reflection, but takes the particular from its object itself, since it is itself its principle and soul. (Adopted by Plato: soul as the principle of movement).