Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 20
Believe/Boer: (instead of mental reference): here it is not so clear whether this is an existence-independent relation, solely because of the fact that we have the being/existening-distinction.
Thought content: Problem: we still do not know what thought contents are.
Platonism/N.B.: If we assume that ideas can be equated with propositions, states, or properties, and that they would be accepted as platonic in existence, without having to participate in the world, we would not have to assume the believe relation as existence-independent. But we need a proper theory of the nature of belief contents and attitude relations to them.
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I 21
Mental reference/concept dependency/Boer: is it also dependent on the concept?
Concept dependency/logical form/Boer: according to (D5): it would be sufficient that mental reference (thinking about) implies that for a representation z, an intrinsic property of z and a behavior-determining relation Q:
A) x has Q to z
B) z contains something that expresses or maps y for x
C) whether x has the relation Q to a representation of y depends on whether the representation has one or more of a range of intrinsic features. But this presupposes believe as a concept-dependent relation.
Belief/question: whether believe is a relation mediated by representations.
So
B) z has a fulfillment condition defined by y and
C) as above.
Believe/Representation/Boer: to clarify whether believe is a representation-mediated relation, we need a theory of propositional attitudes.