Schwarz I 32
Definition Endurantism/Lewis/Schwarz: (VsPerdurantism): Thesis: Things are wholly present (not only in part) at all times, at which they exist (like Aristotelian universals).
>
Universals.
LewisVsEndurantism (instead: Mosaic Theory).
Schwarz I 31
Definition Perdurantism/Lewis/Schwarz: the thesis that temporally extended things usually consist of temporal parts.
Mosaic/Lewis: Thesis: All truths about our world also about the temporal extent of things, are based on the properties and relationships between spatially extended points.
EndurantismVsLewis: since he has nothing to do with mosaic, this is no argument for him.
LewisVsEndurantism: better argument: intrinsic change: if normal things do not have temporal parts but exist at different times, they cannot be round, nor large, but only round at time t. And that is absurd.
Schwarz I 32
Properties/some authors: certainly, not all property are relational like "being remote" - but could they not be time-relational, ignoring this constant dependency? (Haslanger 1989: 123f,[1], Jackson 1994b, 142f,[2] van Inwagen 1990a, 116[3]).
Properties/Lewis: (2004.4) At least abstract geometric objects can simply be round, therefore "round" is not generally a relation to times.
Properties/Endurantism/Johnston: Thesis: one should not relativize the properties, but their instantiations temporally. (Johnston, 1987, §5) E.g. I am now sitting and was sleeping last night.
Others: (Haslanger, 1989): Thesis: time specifications (>
time) are adverbial modifications of propositions: For example, I am sitting in the present way and am sleeping last night.
LewisVsJohnston/LewisVsHaslanger: that makes no big difference. These representatives, too, deny that form properties belong directly, simply, and themselves to the things.
Perdurantism/Endurantism/Schwarz: the debate has been settled, both are accusing each other to analyze change away.
Endurantism: is an instantiation of incompatible properties and has nothing to do with change.
Perdurantism: is a timeless instantiation of compatible properties, for example, being straight exactly at t1, being curved at t0, is not a change.
Schwarz: both do not correspond to our intuitions. The change is not that important.
Cf. >
Perdurantism.
1.Sally Haslanger [1989]: “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics”. Analysis, 49: 119–125
— [1994]: “Humean Supervenience and Enduring Things”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
72: 339–359
2. “Metaphysics by Possible Cases”. In [Jackson 1998b] Mind, Method and Conditionals: Selected Essays. London: Routledge
3.“Four-Dimensional Objects”. Noˆus, 24: 245–256. In [van Inwagen 2001]
