Lexicon of Arguments

 

II 464
Reductionism/Churchland: Thesis: I am a reductionist. This does not mean that a pure bottom up strategy should be pursued.
    I also do not mean that descriptions of higher levels would be dubious in themselves.
There are clearly higher-level properties, and so there is a need for corresponding descriptions.
>Levels/order, >Description levels
Definition Bottom up/Churchland: is the opinion according to which one must first know everything about the molecular basis before the psychological processes can be achieved.
But this is not a reductionism either.
II 468
VsReductionism/other authors:
A) The goal is absurd. Stereotype critique: "I cannot imagine that pain should consist of any activity patterns of neurons"
ChurchlandVsVs: that is nothing more than the impotence of the imagination.
II 470
Vs Reductionism: if a macro-phenomenon can be the result of more than one mechanism (organization and dynamics of the components), then it cannot be identified with one of these mechanisms. The reduction of the macro-phenomenons on a single micro-phenomenon is then not possible. (>"Multiple realizability").
ChurchlandVsVs.
II 471
Reductionism/Churchland: when the mechanism of a biological process has been discovered, it may be possible to invent devices that mimic these processes.
The reductive success is not denied. Just as little, perhaps, that there might be DNAs in other parts of the universe.
Reductionism/Churchland: It is not easy to argue VsReductionism and not to fall into dualism. (VsSearle).
>Dualism, >Monism, >Property dualism.