Lexicon of Arguments

 Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


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Theses II

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Schiffer I 159
Eliminativism/Churchland/Schiffer: (Paul Churchland 1981)(1): his eliminativism is quite different from that of Quine: Here the irreducibility of intentional vocabulary is denied.
Folk Psychology/Churchland: is a functional theory. Belief is a functional state, with a functional role but future neuroscience will show that no inner states have these roles and therefore the folk psychology is wrong.
Schiffer: this is a completely different route to eliminativism than that belief cannot be realized physically because our intentional vocabulary was irreducible.
I 164
... SchifferVsChurchland: his eliminativism would then have the consequence that no one believes anything.


1. Churchland, Paul (1981). "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes". Journal of Philosophy. 78 (2, February): 67–90.

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