|When discussing the picture theory it comes to the question, to what extent a sentence is image of a fact, a situation or a section of the world. How should the sentence parts correspond to parts of the world? Is there such a correspondence at all?:|
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|Picture Theory||Danto I 70/71
Image Theory/Picture Theory/Wittgenstein/Danto: thesis: the world has the same shape as the language. - Without that the world itself would be somehow linguistically in its structure i.e. more of a reflection.
Hintikka I 67
Picture theory/Image theory/Facts/Object/Early Wittgenstein/Hintikka : - when the sentence is a linguistic counterpart of the matter.
Then that connection is no relation, but the existence of a relation - ((s) the relation of the state of affairs is the existence of the subject matter - this is Wittgenstein's position before the Tractatus - WittgensteinVs: Vs later - Russell: pro.
Image/Image Theory/Theory of Reflection/Bild/Abbild/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: comes from Frege - is also found in Tarski again.
Hintikka: thesis: the - image - theory? is in reality an anticipation of the first condition Tarski truth theory.
WittgensteinVsTarski : a truth theory is inexpressible.
ARb/Expressions/Representation/Image Theory/Image theory/Complex/Wittgenstein/Hintikka : not a character (E.g. - R) represents something - but the linguistic relationship attached to it - the linguistic relation is not a class of pairs of individuals (Frege value pattern) - but a real relationship - WittgensteinVsFrege - TarskiVsWittgenstein/CarnapVsWittgenstein/(s): extensional semantics - Item/WittgensteinVsFrege: Elements of possible facts - then the relation that the - - R always corresponds to a special relation.
Image theory/Theory of reflection/(Abbild, Widerspiegelung)/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: no image relation, but isomorphism - (truth conditions) no theory of language, but the truth.
Can be described as theory but not expressed (structural equivalence, isomorphism).
Image theory/Theory of reflection/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: only simple sentences are images - not complex sentences - these would only be recipes for the construction of images - if you would permit this, you would have no argument for the special status of some sentences: - namely to be true.
Image theory/Theory of reflection/Reflection/Tractatus/Hintikka: Image unequal reflection - illustration: require that some of the connections allowed to play some of the possible configurations of objects - but it does not follow that the reflection must be complete - i.e. not each link must speak of a possible issue - Name: no image of the object - but it can reflect it - Sentence: Image - logic: reflection of reality (Widerspiegelung, Abbild).
Wittgenstein/Early/Middle/late/Plant/Hintikka: Image Theory: was abandoned 1929 - Hintikka: he has never represented a perfect picture theory - later than 1929: Vs the thesis that language functions according to strict rules - Hintikka: that he might never have represented - 1934/35: new: language games. WittgensteinVsTractatus: VsReflection.
Language/Medium Wittgenstein 1929: physical language instead of phenomenological language - ((s) b > Quine) - but it is always the ordinary language.
Language/Thought/World/Reality/Image Theory/Theory of Reflection/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the actual relationship between language (thinking) and reality cannot be a part of reality itself - because the image B, which should reflect the ratio between A and S, would then be identical with A - hence the sentence can only schow its sense, it cannot express it.
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996