Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Abstract: non-representational - abstract concept, expression of something non-objective - how to demarcate from concrete objects? How to differentiate between abstract entities and concepts, ultimately words.
 
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Quine, Willard Van Orman
 
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Abstractness I 102
Abstract/Concrete: independent from stimulus meaning.
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I 212 ff
Abstract terms: alleged names of properties - "roundness": "F"/"round":"a" in "Fa" - should not be used unhesitatingly without metaphysical definition - would be too non-binding - every abstract singular term provides an abstract general term.
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I 219
Not all abstract objects are properties: numbers, classes, functions, geometrical figures, ideas, possibilities - giving up or re-tracing abstract objects - faithfully distinguish them from concrete ones by use of "-ness".
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I 238
Plural: abstract singular term: "lions are dying out" -Disposition: "eats mice" (31).
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I 286
Intensional abstraction: "the act of being a dog", "the act of baking a cake", "the act of erring".
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I 289
Class abstraction attributed to singular descriptions: (iy)(x)(x from y iff ..x..) - instead of: x^(..x..) - is not possible for intensional abstraction.
Difference classes/Properties: classes identical, with the same elements - properties not quite identical if they are attributed to the same things.
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I 361f
Abstraction of relations, propositions and properties: opaque (planets).
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I 295
Class abstraction: transparent, - intensional abstraction: opaque.
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V 167
Abstract general term: relative clause: "Y is a class X such that FX" - new: these are classes of classes. Normal relative clause: = general term: "y is a thing x such that Fx".
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VII 75
Concrete/abstract/Quine: by pointing to a square we do not assume identity with others - "squareness" is shared by other objects, but we do not need to insinuate entities like "attributes" - we do not point to the "attributes" (as an entity) nor do we need it in reference to the word "square".
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VII 77
Abstract singular term/Quine: like names - philosophically revolutionary: setting abstract entities - (unlike general term).
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VII 113
Abstract entities/Quine: classes and truth values may be accepted abstract entities - only statements and predicates should not be regarded as names of these and other entities, i.e. "p", "q"p,"F" etc. should not be bindable (quantifiable) variables (>2nd order logic) - (E.g.)(x is a dog. x is white.) does not commit X to "dogness" or to the class of white things as universals. - Solution: explicit form: belonging to two classes: (Ex)(xεy.xεz). - Of course, there are names for abstract entities: singular term: "dogness" "class of white things" (as names ((s) it does not imply existence).

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-27