Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Abstract: non-representational - abstract concept, expression of something non-objective - how to demarcate from concrete objects? How to differentiate between abstract entities and concepts, ultimately words.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Quine, Willard Van Orman
Books on Amazon
Abstractness I 102
Abstract/Concrete: independent from stimulus meaning.
I 212 ff
Abstract terms: alleged names of properties - "roundness": "F"/"round":"a" in "Fa" - should not be used unhesitatingly without metaphysical definition - would be too non-binding - every abstract singular term provides an abstract general term.
I 219
Not all abstract objects are properties: numbers, classes, functions, geometrical figures, ideas, possibilities - giving up or re-tracing abstract objects - faithfully distinguish them from concrete ones by use of "-ness".
I 238
Plural: abstract singular term: "lions are dying out" -Disposition: "eats mice" (31).
I 286
Intensional abstraction: "the act of being a dog", "the act of baking a cake", "the act of erring".
I 289
Class abstraction attributed to singular descriptions: (iy)(x)(x from y iff ..x..) - instead of: x^(..x..) - is not possible for intensional abstraction.
Difference classes/Properties: classes identical, with the same elements - properties not quite identical if they are attributed to the same things.
I 361f
Abstraction of relations, propositions and properties: opaque (planets).
I 295
Class abstraction: transparent, - intensional abstraction: opaque.
V 167
Abstract general term: relative clause: "Y is a class X such that FX" - new: these are classes of classes. Normal relative clause: = general term: "y is a thing x such that Fx".
VII 75
Concrete/abstract/Quine: by pointing to a square we do not assume identity with others - "squareness" is shared by other objects, but we do not need to insinuate entities like "attributes" - we do not point to the "attributes" (as an entity) nor do we need it in reference to the word "square".
VII 77
Abstract singular term/Quine: like names - philosophically revolutionary: setting abstract entities - (unlike general term).
VII 113
Abstract entities/Quine: classes and truth values may be accepted abstract entities - only statements and predicates should not be regarded as names of these and other entities, i.e. "p", "q"p,"F" etc. should not be bindable (quantifiable) variables (>2nd order logic) - (E.g.)(x is a dog. x is white.) does not commit X to "dogness" or to the class of white things as universals. - Solution: explicit form: belonging to two classes: (Ex)(xεy.xεz). - Of course, there are names for abstract entities: singular term: "dogness" "class of white things" (as names ((s) it does not imply existence).

W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-26