|Abstract: non-representational - abstract concept, expression of something non-objective - how to demarcate from concrete objects? How to differentiate between abstract entities and concepts, ultimately words.|
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|Abstractness||I 226 f
Abstract/Purely Abstract Objects/Dummett: (Frege:" logical objects "): Dummett: nothing more than reflections of certain linguistic expressions, analogous to the proper names of objects whose meaning, however, cannot be presented as being our ability to identify objects as their carriers.
Wright: could be read as nominalism (i.e. that there are no abstract objects). But that is not Dummett's view. Dummett precisely does not deny that there are singular terms that ostensibly refer to abstract objects, but have reference indeed. They even play a semantic role! Example "largest prime number": empty singular term, but the mere meaning ensures that it plays a semantic role! Dummett: seems to think here that there is no question about whether Platonism or Nominalism provides the better approach according to which the question is decided whether abstract objects exist. (>Numbers).
Abstract/Morality/Ethics/Wright: that matches our approach to discourse of morality well: the cause of moral realism is not really confined to the question whether moral discourse is capable of truth, or not. If the "capacity for truth" is affirmed, there are still a number of realism-relevant questions.
I 223 ff
It is also not in dispute that we use abstract singular terms in an intelligent manner.
Wright: There is no linguistically unmediated cognitive contact with abstract objects.
Frege (Platonist) asserts quite correctly, that doubts about the reality of the reference to abstract objects do not contain any rational sense. (Wright: This is minimalism regarding reference).
Abstract Singular Terms/Wright: it is impossible that they influence the thinking of someone who does not know what they are.
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001