Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Actualism: in relation to worlds the thesis that only our own world is real. - Counter-position essentialism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D.M. Armstrong on Actualism - Dictionary of Arguments
III 8/9 Actualism/Armstrong per: not assuming possible things under any circumstances - but past + future are real and do exist - truthmaker must be actual. >Truthmakers. III 125 Anti-Actualism/Armstrong: (E.g. uninstantiated idiosyncratic reaction between particles with high probability). Someone might say, "there might also have been a different reaction" the law of excluded middle applies - Armstrong: someone like this assumes non-actual physically possible states that also involve particulars; because they are part of the ontology, they are defined. ArmstrongVs: that is extreme non-actualism. Solution: instead: non-factualism: there are no facts here - that is why the law of excluded middle fails here. >Nonfactualism, >Universals, >Nominalism. III 135 Actualism/Probability/Armstrong: rejects irreducible potentialities (possibilia) - (Armstrong ditto) - Question: Is probability not merely an unrealized possibility? - ArmstrongVs: it is a fact which other categorical properties the object has._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20