Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Antirealism: (Michael Dummett) the thesis that it has to be possible to be shown through behavior that alternatives to an assumed fact could make a difference. In the case of undecidable sentences such as the number of geese on the Capitol this is not possible.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Putnam, Hilary
Books on Amazon
Anti-Realism Horwich I 393
Anti-Realism/Anti-RealismVsPhenomenalism/DummettVsHusserl: there is no basis of - "hard facts" (DummettVsSense Data) - Understanding/Dummett: to understand a sentence is to know what its verification would be. - N.B.: the sentence is verified by being spoken - ((s) In such and such circumstances) - Still not incorrigible - the sentence does not need to be bivalent. - Soft Fact/Putnam: self-affirmation of observation statements - N.B.: the realistic concept of truth and reference is not needed for that. - Therefore, no problem of the "right" (intended) reference relation - If we introduce reference a la Tarski, "'cow' refers to 'cows'" becomes a tautology. - Advantage: we need no metaphysical realism for understanding. - Verificationism: must then also be applied in the meta language. - i.e. we cannot use any hard facts (nor sense data). - Otherwise, Wittgenstein private language argument applies.
Putnam I 124
Anti-Realism/Dummett/Putnam: (like intuitionism) requires that a verification process is mastered. - Problem: we can never say what the knowledge of the truth conditions consists of -> Löwenheim: no problem for the Anti-Realism: since it is oriented at a process which must always be re-found. - It must only renounce models of verification. - With a rich meta-language it can introduce Tarski definitions that are model-independent. - It can then speak about models again.
II 125
It can even define reference a la Tarski.
I 150
Anti-Realism/Truth/Dummett: we need an "external" concept of truth (or accuracy) above Tarski's internal (tautological) equivalence: justified assertibility. - Not only by facts but by perceived and conceived states of affairs. - It's about justification conditions, not about mind-external truth conditions.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

> Counter arguments against Putnam
> Counter arguments in relation to Anti-Realism

> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX file
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-23