Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
| |||
Attributive/referential: difference in reference - attributive "whoever it is" (may not be identified) - referential the identified object._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
---|---|---|---|
S.A. Kripke on Attributive/referential - Dictionary of Arguments
II 209 KripkeVsDonnellan: Donnellan's theory is correct, but does not refute Russell's (better, because more consistent) theory. The distinction referential/attributive has nothing to do with distinction de re/de dicto (Donnellan ditto). >de re, >de dicto. II 236f Referential/attributive/KripkeVsDonnellan: the distinction between speaker reference and semantic reference is needed anyway, it is sufficient instead of the distinction referential/attributive. E.g. the real husband is irrelevant. I might not have confused two people - I just believe that a person has a property that it lacks in reality. II 222 E.g. "Her husband is kind to her"/Linsky/Kripke: problem with the statement: is it true? The use cannot be analyzed here, only the meanings of the sentence. In the referential use it is unclear what is meant by "statement". >Donnellan._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 |