Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Statement: once a statement is made the utterer is committed to it. In contrast to this, a sentence can be thought of as a string of symbols that is no statement. See also Assertions, Sentences, Utterances, Judgments._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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J. Fodor on Statements - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 48 Statement/Quine/holism/Fodor/Lepore: let us assume, statements would be propositions. Fodor/Lepore: then statements are trans-theoretical entities that can be expressed by the formulas of more than a theory. That would contradict holism. Quine nowhere says what he meant by statements. Translation holism: problem: from the fact that the proposition P necessarily presupposes that there is a proposition Q does not follow that a language can express both. > Statements/Quine, >Sentences/Quine, >Propositions/Quine, >Holism/Quine._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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> Counter arguments against Fodor
> Counter arguments in relation to Statements
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18