|Meaning: Differs from the reference object (reference). The object does not have to exist for an expression to have a meaning. Words are not related to objects in a one-to-one correspondence. There is an important distinction between word meaning and sentence meaning. See also use theory, sentence meaning, reference, truth.|
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Meaning/Tugendhat ultimately not based on objects ( not any more than on circumstances) but on truth conditions - later verification conditions.
Sentence: Meaning/Tugendhat by specifying its truth conditions - and explains this by demonstrating the way of verification.
Meaning / Tugendhat: the meaning of the sentence p is not the fact that p : that fails with sentences that contain deictic expressions - different situations have different truth conditions.
Meaning/Tugendhat: of a sentence: function - arguments: use-situations of the sentence - values: the assertions ( truth conditions )
Meaning/Tugendhat: function whose arguments are the speech situations and their values are the objects . " The meaning maps the speech situations on the items - Vs : that is metalinguistically - it requires understanding of " I " , "here" , etc. first to understand - (because demontratives are not names) - substitutability is the meaning of demonstratives.
Meaning/Frege/Tugendhat: should not be translate as "reference" - Reference. only where Frege conceives sentences as a proper name (-> Schulte ) - Frege distinguishes between reference of names and truth values of sentences.
Otherwise error/Frege: .. that you can mingle meaning and concept on the one hand and meaning and subject matter on the other hand. - Correct: "What two concept words ( predicates ) mean ist the same iff the corresponding extents ( value curves ) coincide.
Tugendhat: ( meaning/ref): nevertheless there is a primacy of truth over the objects.
Meaning/Tugendhat: sentences are meaningful in that they can be t / f - predicates by apply to some (and not others) objects - Names: denote something, predicates can be attributed to a thing.
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992