|Meaning theory: a theory that seeks to explain the meaning of meaning. Problem the concept of meaning and truth seem to presuppose each other.|
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|Meaning Theory||Avr I 27
Meaning Theory/m.th./Loar : can not be drawn as a purely extensional truth theory: - problem:
1st The equivalence of "Snow is white" and "Grass is green"
2nd Hesperus is bright iff Phosphorus is bright,
3rd "Snow ist white and 2+ 2 = 4" - solution/Fodor/Lepore :the right hand side must be a translation from the left.
Meaning Theory/Avramides: Thesis: the problems disappear when it comes to the big picture: how sounds turn to speech acts? - Only then the truth conditions will come up, because the meaning theory must fit into a theory of power. - Lewis sounds have truth conditions only relative to a language . - Psychology comes into play only when it comes to favoring one language in a population.
EMD II 139f
Meaning Theory/Loar: a) extensional (Quine, Davidson ) - b) Loar : intensional: semantic concepts are
located within a larger framework of propositional attitudes - Davidson intermediate position.
Meaning Theory/Davidson: main problem: how to avoid: " Snow is white " is true if grass is green - if one accepts this as extensionally right ( correct) , then there is not more than that in the idea of the meaning.
Meaning Theory./Loar: a list does not work: "x is camel1 , or camel2 ... ": No understanding of a sentence.
Wrong solution: simplicity: "x is a camel " is only satisfied by y, if y is a camel - Vs : too strong and too vague - for someone who knows nothing of a language that meaning theory does not work that way. The Tarski schema " S is true ... " ( equivalence scheme) does not give the meaning. - We also need at least " an expression x is S and ... " - Problem: we then have a metametalanguage.
Solution/Loar: when entities were meanings ( propositions?) they could distinguish sentence meaning from anything else , what else is true in the sentence.
Meaning Theory/Loar: Thesis: a meaning theory is a theory of mind, not vice versa.
Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989