|Meaning change/semantic change: question does the meaning of the terms of a theory change in the light of new knowledge?|
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|Meaning Change||II 173
Meaning Change/Meaning/Field: E.g. "has the same temperature" has changed - because one now knows that differently warm objects can feel equally warm - N.B.: "means that" cannot change. - It is empirically irrevidable. - Solution: "Temperature" is an explanatory term. - Meanings (also as intentional entities as "mere shadows") should not be interpreted as explanatory. - Then the attribution should be kept, no matter what discoveries we make. - On the other hand: meaning-characterization: is explanatory - namely causal.
Meaning change/Field: Thesis: with the change of theories the reference of scientific terms (TT) is indeterminate. - There is no fact that decides. - E.g.: For Newton, and in the Special Relativity Theory, "mass" had no definite denotation.
Theory change/meaning change/change of concept/Kuhn/Field: (Kuhn 1961, 101) Thesis: The referents of Einstein's terms are never identical with those of the Newtonian terms, which bear the same name. Newton's mass remains intact, Einstein's mass is convertible against energy - FieldVsKuhn: that seems completely implausible, Einstein has shown that there is no "Newtonian mass" - Newton's concept meant something else, I do not deny that - but this does not apply to reference or denotation. - Today's terms refer to a subset of what the Newtonians referred to. - FieldVsKuhn: something like "Newton's mass" has never existed - so Newton himself can never have referred to it. - Problem: then the sentences are wrong. - Solution: E.g. "Acceleration needs more force when the mass is larger." - This is not completely lacking denotation. - The reference is simply indeterminate - ((s) Today only a subset of the speakers at the time make the sentence true.)
Meaning change/change of concept/theory change/Putnam: thesis: the reference usually survives in scientific revolutions.
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980