|Concept: term for an entity with certain properties. The properties of an object correspond to the features of the concept. These concept features are necessary in contrast to the properties of an individual object, which are always contingent.|
|Geach, Peter T.
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Concept/Frege/Geach: the meaning of "people" is not "many people", but the concept.
Concept/GeachVsFrege: Frege: "The concept horse is not a concept" - i.e. it must be an object: this is a fallacy! - Not objects are realized, but concepts. - (The former is not falsehood, but nonsense). - Correct: E.g. "The concept human being is realized" is divided into "human being" and "the concept ... is realized" - the latter = "something is a...". - What cannot be divided like this, is meaningless: E.g. "the concept human bein is timeless".
Concept/Frege: purely extensional view - therefore not "sense of the name", but reference of the predicate. - ((s) reference/(s): set of designated objects = extension.) - But: Extension/Frege: Object - Concept/Frege: not an object - reason: the concept is unsaturated, the object is saturated. - "Red" does not stand for a concept, otherwise the concept would be a name.
Concept/Geach: "The concept horse" is not a concept, because otherwise concepts would have names - (...+...) - Nor is a concept a logical unit. - No more than e.g. "Napoleon was a great general and the conqueror of Napoleon was a great general". - E.g. "A man is wise" is not an instance of "___ is wise " ("a man" is not a name), but of a derived predicate "a ... is wise" - sentences from which "the concept of human being" cannot be eliminated are pointless! - E.g. "The concept human being is an abstract entity" - sentences about concepts need a quantifier.
Concept/Geach: cannot have a proper name. - Instead, we refer the concept with the predicate. - VsFrege: he uses pseudo-proper names for concepts: "The extension of the concept x cut the throat of x'." Pseudo-name: "the concept x cut x" - Geach: correct: the name of the extension is "the range of x for x cut the throat of x'."
Concept/Object/Quine: the distinction is unnecessary! - GeachVsQuine: it is necessary! - Quine's disguised distinction between class and element corresponds to it.
Logic Matters Oxford 1972