|Concept: term for an entity with certain properties. The properties of an object correspond to the features of the concept. These concept features are necessary in contrast to the properties of an individual object, which are always contingent.|
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|Concepts||Horwich I 392
Concepts/Ockham/Putnam: could be mental particulars. - I.e. if characters are particulars as "signs", then any concept we have of the relation between sign and object is another sign. - PutnamVsOckham: Problem: this relation cannot be unambiguously identified by holding up a sign with COW - or another sign, with REFERS.
On the other hand: if concepts are not particulars, there may be uses of signs (if they are "in the head") - (Putnam pro). - But: Problem: the use does not clearly single out a relation between the concepts and "real objects". - ((s) "Concept": Here "way of using characters") - If concepts are neither particulars (signs) nor ways of use, only the mysterious "grasping of forms" remains.
Putnam V 40ff
Concepts/Putnam: cannot be identical to inner notions, because concepts are public - they are (partially) skills, not incidents.
Cluster Concept/Putnam: E.g."human" as a list of properties - PutnamVs: the speaker does not need to have any knowledge of the laws that rule the electrons. - Even if reference was "socially" determined, this cannot correspond to what "every speaker implicitly means".
Concept/Possible World/Putnam: modern semantics: functions about possible worlds represent concepts - e.g. the term "this statue" is not equal to the term "this piece of clay". - PutnamVsPossible Worlds: Question: is there in the real world (the actual world) an object to which one of these concepts applies essentially and the other one only accidentally? - Possible Worlds deliver too many objects. PutnamVsKripke:/PutnamVsEssentialism: Kripke's ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot justify it. - Modal properties are not part of the materialistic equipment of the world. - But Kripke individuates objects by their modal properties. - Essential Characteristics/Putnam: I have not shifted them to "parallel worlds" but rather to possible states of the real world - (e.g. a liquid other than H20 is water). - This is essentialist in as far as it allowed us to discover the nature of water. - We just say water should be nothing else (intention). - That's simply our use and not "built into the world" (intrinsic) - (Kripke ditto). - VsMaterialism: this semantic interpretation does not help him, because it already presupposes reference. - (Materialism wants to gain reference from "intrinsic" causal relationship).
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994