|Concept: term for an entity with certain properties. The properties of an object correspond to the features of the concept. These concept features are necessary in contrast to the properties of an individual object, which are always contingent.|
Books on Amazon:
|Concepts||I 185 ff
Neither are there views that can be dissolved to terms (like Carnap), nor internal relations between concepts that enable "grammatical discoveries" (as in the Oxford philosophy). There is probably nothing left today that would be "analytic philosophy".
RortyVsOxford: there are no grammatical discoveries alone between terms.
RortyVsPutnam (internal realism): this means no more than that we should congratulate ourselves on the invention of the term lithium, so that something stands for lithium, for which all the time there had been nothing. The fact that based on our insights we are coping with the world very well is true, but trivial. That we adequately reflect it is "just an image".
Platonic concepts: the trouble with them is not that they are "false", but that not much can be said about them. They cannot be naturalized or otherwise connected with our needs.
Davidson: would probably say the good would not require verificationist arguments.
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000