Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Assertibility: in certain circumstances or in a historical situation the possibility to make a statement when the linguistic means are given._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D. Lewis on Assertibility - Dictionary of Arguments
V 139 Assertibility/conditional/semantics/: we assume assertibility instead of truth because of the probability. However, assertibility is best gained through truth conditions plus a sincerity condition. Adams: the other way around: there are truth conditions not for the entire conditional, but individually for antecedent and consequent "plus a rule that assertibility of the indicative conditional is possible with the conditional subjective probability of the consequent given by the antecedent. Lewis pro (>Adams Conditional). LewisVsAdams: means something different: he calls this "indicative conditional" what Lewis calls a "probability conditional". Adams: the probability of conditionals is not equal to the probability of truth. AdamsVsLewis: probability of conditionals does not obey the standard laws of probability. Solution/Lewis: if we do not mention truth, probability of conditionals obeys the standard laws. Then the indicative conditional has no truth value and no truth conditions, i.e. Boolean connections, but no truth-functional ones (not Truth Functional). V 142 Assertibility/conditional/Lewis: assertibility should correspond to the subjective probability (Lewis pro Grice). The assertibility is reduced by falsehood or trivial being-true. This leads to conditional probability. From this we have to deduct the measured assertibility from the probability of the truth of the truth-functional conditional (horseshoe, ⊃)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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> Counter arguments against Lewis
> Counter arguments in relation to Assertibility
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19