Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Assertibility: in certain circumstances or in a historical situation the possibility to make a statement when the linguistic means are given.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Strawson, Peter F.
 
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Assertibility Nail I 71
Crispin Wright: considers the view that truth could range further than assertibility to be too extreme: how can a sentence be unrecognizably true? (VsRealism)
StrawsonVs this draws the image of what Wittgenstein has reportedly asserted: it simply does not correspond with our most evident experience. We understand the meaning of what we say and hear well enough to at least occasionally recognize inconsistencies and conclusions in what was said which are attributable solely to the sense or the meaning of what was said.

Wright I 77
Wright: Assertibility/Strawson: the assertibility-conditional conception has "no explanation for what a speaker actually does when he utters the sentence".
StrawsonVsSemantic Anti-Realists: it only makes sense to consider an assertion to be justified if this assertion supports the commitment to something that lies beyond its justification. ((s) "background", single, isolated sentences are not assertible but neither are they sensibly debatable.)

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-27