Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Assertibility: in certain circumstances or in a historical situation the possibility to make a statement when the linguistic means are given._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Cr Wright on Assertibility - Dictionary of Arguments
I 26ff It is not the case that P is T iff it is not the case that P is T. This is not valid for justified assertibility from right to left. Assertibility is naturally weaker. >Asymmetry, >Equivalence, >Implication. I 26 Justified Assertibility/Negation: Ignorance: P is not justifiably assertible, but neither is its negation. >Negation, >Justification. Truth/Ignorance: something may very well be true, even though nothing is known about it. >Realism, >Metaphysical realism. Truth/Justified Assertibility: E.g. snow is white: the decision about truth and assertibility may diverge here. I 51 Deflationism: "true" only means of affirmation, therefore not a standard different from assertibility. >Truth, cf. >Redundancy theory. A statement can be justified without being true and vice versa. >Conventions, cf. >Language use, >Language community. --- Field II 120 Assertibility/Wright/Putnam: is the only substantial property. - Because truth is not a property. - Field: both do go next to each other, because they diverge - truth goes deeper. - - - Wright I 35 Justified Assertibility/Assertibility/Negation: E.g. it is not the case that P is T iff. it is not the case that P is T - This is not valid for justified assertibility from right to left - in case of ignorance, the negation is not assertible either. I 52ff Truth: timeless - justified assertibility: not timeless. >Timelessness. I 68ff Def Super-Assertibility: a statement is super-assertible if it is justified or can be justified and if its justification survived both any scrutiny of its descent and arbitrarily extensive additions and improvements to the information. Cf. >Justified assertibility. Ideal Circumstances/Putnam: are timeless. Super-Assertibility is no external standard, but our own practice. It is metaphysically neutral. I 81ff Super-Assertibility/Wright: Thesis: comic and moral truths can be considered as varieties of super-assertibility. - ((s) Because everything we can learn in the future comes from our own practice, we are immune to fundamental surprises.) I 102f Super-Assertibility/Wright: suitable for discourses whose standards are made by us: morals, humor. >Morals. I 115ff Super-Assertibility/Field/Mackie: the T predicates for mathematics or morality cannot be interpreted in terms of the superassertibility. - Therefore, the super-assertible need not be true in discourse. - The difference Ssuperassertibility/truth goes back to this. >Mathematics, >Truth, >Discourse._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
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> Counter arguments against Wright
> Counter arguments in relation to Assertibility
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18