|Behaviorism: presupposes observable and observed behavior and derives predictions of further behavior from them. As few assumptions as possible about a mental inner life are used for explanation. See also mentalism, behavior, consciousness.|
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Behaviorism/VsRyle/Rorty: 1) It is impossible to give a description of behavioral dispositions which does not consist in an infinitely long list.
2) "Necessity", of whatever kind, does not depend on "meaning" here, but simply reflects the fact that we usually characterize behavior in a certain way. Necessity as little a "linguistic" or "conceptual" one as the necessary link between the redness of the stove and the fire in the stove. ((s) behavior depends on description.)
3) It is merely a philosophical paradox that only comes to the mind of someone who is chased by instrumentalist or verificationist dogmas, and is constantly eager to reduce any non-observable to the observable to avoid any risk to believe in something unreal.
Rorty: all three are justified, yet you get the feeling that the behaviorism is on to something right. But you will not say one day, "Okay, no feelings, i.e. no mental states, i.e. no people"
Behaviorism: Point: he makes it clear that the question of the harder philosophers: "Are there mental states or are there no mental states?" are thus more pointless the more often they are asked.
RortyVsRyle: he should have said that incorrigibility is simply a function of the practice of justification. It was wrong to speak of a necessary and sufficient condition for the attribution of feelings.
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000