Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Behaviorism: presupposes observable and observed behavior and derives predictions of further behavior from them. As few assumptions as possible about a mental inner life are used for explanation. See also mentalism, behavior, consciousness.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Sellars, Wilfrid
 
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Behaviorism Rorty I 118
SellarsVsRyle: 1) the parallel statement about macro/micro-phenomena does not compel into the operationalist thesis that there can be no micro-entities (f.o.th.).
2) Similarly, the fact that behavior is evidence for sensations ( "built into the logic" of sensation concepts) does not mean that there can be no sensations. Privileged status: is not logically, but merely empirically privileged. (Prerequisite for Sellars, however, was Quine's attack on the distinction between logical and empirical.) Ryle's error was: the evidence of a "necessary connection" between dispositions and internal states shows that in reality there were no internal states. Just as wrong as the instrument's cunning approach: "There are no positrons, there are merely dispositions of electrons to...", "there are no physical objects, there are merely dispositions of sense data to...".
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Rorty VI 182
Behavior/Sellars: a difference which is not apparent in behavior is not a difference that makes a difference
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Sellars I XXIXf
Methodological Behaviorism (Sellars): VsLogical behaviorism.
Logical behaviorism: is essentially a thesis on the meaning of mental terms. (Carnap, Hempel) mainly concentrated on 'pain' as a psychological predicate.
PutnamVsLogical Behaviorism: E.g. "Super Spartans" who never expressed their pain in any way.
Methodological Behaviorism: (Sellars) introduces mental terms with view to observable behavior, but does not maintain that these terms should be defined in terms of behavior.
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I 91
Behaviorism: also requires theoretical terms (to assume thoughts).

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29