Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
| |||
Acquaintance: direct handling and contact with a subject matter about which statements are to be made as a basis for knowledge. Antonym to knowledge through description._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
---|---|---|---|
R. Chisholm on Acquaintance - Dictionary of Arguments
II 120 Acquaintance/Chisholm: "epistemic familiarity" ("epistemically close") - even without acquaintance, by source of information - then knowledge possible that it is one and the same, from acquaintance and from description. >Description, >Knowledge, >Causal theory of knowledge. II 125 "Epistemic familiarity" is only in special cases sufficient: in the purely referential ones. II 123 Reference/acquaintance/description/BrandlVsChisholm: Problem: two kinds of unitary relation - that corresponds to the problem that the user can do both, attributional or referential reference. >Reference, >Attributive/referential. II 124 BrandlVsChisholm: his error lies in the equation of "knowing" of objects with a knowledge which we can acquire in a purely linguistic way. Epistemically close/Chisholm: more relationships to objects - it only appears to me - also knowing that. >Appearance. BrandlVs: but that is only theoretical knowledge! II 125 Sufficient only in purely referential cases. Brandl, Johannes. Gegen den Primat des Intentionalen. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |