|Evidence: proof of the existence and the behavior of objects or of the truth of statements. Evidence can be direct or indirect. See also theories, facts.|
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Knowledge/Riddles/Kripke/Nozick: conundrum: why would you seek evidence against something that you know. - You know then that the evidence must be wrong. - Nozick: a theory of knowledge must be able to handle it. - Solution: conversely, if one does not know that the evidence is misleading, one should not ignore it.
Evidence/hypothesis/Nozick: often evidence can apply, even if the hypothesis is false. - Test: search for data that would not apply if the hypothesis was true, but the evidence is not. - Then, the hypothesis has not passed the test.
II 254 f
Evidence/hypotheses/Nozick/(s): the initial probability (P0) of the hypothesis must be considered. One cannot just put up any hypothesis. Therefore conclusion from P (evidence e I Hypo h)> = 0.95, P (e,~h) <= 0.05 not sure if e is more likely to follow from h-h or not, depends on which of the two weighted conditional probabilities is greater, P (el h) times P0(h) or P(e l ~ h) times P0(not-h).
Evidence/hypothesis/theory/Nozick: if e is evidence for hypothesis h, depends on what other theories we have that connects e and h . - Problem: the other theories could in turn be embedded in a wider context, etc. - regress.
PutnamVsTradition: therefore "evidence for" is not a formal logical relation. - It is rather dependent on other theories.
Induction/evidence/logic/Nozick: the inductive logic is twofold relative - 1. probability is relative to the evidence - 2. There must be a principle of total evidence, which is applied to the probability statements. - Some authors: Solution: an evidence is an evidence for what it explains. - NozickVs: much evidence is not explanatory - e.g. lightning/thunder do not explain themselves mutually - e.g. a symptom makes probably more, but they do not explain mutually. - Perhaps there are quite general statistical relations between statements - e.g. principles of the uniformity of nature.
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981
The Nature of Rationality 1994