Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Designation: ascription of a character to an object that allows the localization within an order, as opposed to naming. See also denotation, individuation, identification, specification.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Geach, Peter T.
Books on Amazon
Designation I 52
Naming/Denotation/Two-Name Theory/ZNT/GeachVsAristoteles: Incorrect approximation of predication and naming: as if predicates were (complex) names : "on the mat" - E.g. ((s) "The man stabbing Caesar to death stabbed the one stabbed by Brutus.") Additionally, Geach would use a link - Two-name theory: "Socrates is a philosopher" should be true because the thing is named - Vs: "Philosopher" (general term) is not a name for "all (or every) philosopher".
I 153f
Intentionality/naming/Parmenides/Geach: one cannot name anything that does not exist. (Geach pro) - ((s) existence introduction is not arbitrary, not without premise) - E.g. Geach dreamed of a girl and wants to call it "Pauline" - on the other hand, acquaintance is sufficient - present is not necessary. - Problem: is the girl even more imaginary, if he has not dreamed of her? - Geach: that is a sure sign that this is all nonsense. - Geach with Parmenides: "There is only that what exists." - GeachVsParmenides: However, one can talk about non-existent objects. - E.g. talking about absent friends without knowing that he is dead, changes the truth value, but not the fact that these are sentences. - Imaginary girls are not competing for identification in the dream. - If it is true of no identifiable girl that I dreamed of her, then I have not dreamed of any girl. - Solution: "I dreamed of a girl, but it is not true of a certain girl that I dreamed of her" - Similar to: it is not true of a certain stamp that I want it.
I 252
Predication/Geach: can be done without naming: in an if-that-sentence or in an or-sentence, a term P can be predicated of a thing without naming the thing "P". - E.g.: "If that what the policeman said is true, then he drove faster than 60". This does not call the policeman's sentence true. - (> Conditional) - predication/naming: centuries-old error: that the predicate is uttered by the thing. - Frege: Difference assertion/Predication: to name a thing "P", a sentence must be asserted! But a property is also predicted in a non-assertive sub-clause (subset). - Therefore, naming by predication must be explained, not vice versa.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-25