Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Description dependence: E.g. actions, situations, facts are dependent on the choice of the description, the linguistic means or the underlying theories. See also Theory ladenness, Context dependence, Theories._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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G. Ryle on Description-Dependence - Dictionary of Arguments
Kripke, I 49/50 Necessity/description dependent/Ryle:the description decides whether a property is necessary or contingent. (Kripke: but not all are accidental properties, some are essential). >Necessity, >Contingency, >Actions, >Properties, >Essence._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
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> Counter arguments against Ryle
> Counter arguments in relation to Description-Dependence
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16