Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Field, Hartry
Books on Amazon
Definiteness II 226
Definiteness/determined/definition/definite/vagueness/precision/(s)"definite"/Field: we cannot define "definitively true" ("determined", "determinately") by truth - we must conceive it as a reinforcement - solution : Operator: "Definiteness-Operator" - this one is independent of truth-theoretical terms - but there is no physical information which decides - - "determined" as basic concept - rules correspond to those for "necessary" - then the law of the excluded middle applies - it is definitely the case that he is either bald/non-bald - N.B.: it can still be the case then that he is neither definitely bald nor definitely non-bald - because there is no distribution about disjunction.
II 229
Definiteness-Operator: is used so that the deflationism can distinguish vagueness from non-vagueness - "strong-true" must be defined with definiteness-Operator.
II 231
Vagueness of higher level/Field/VsFine: the definiteness-operator is more natural than the Penumbar - FieldVsPenumbra: unnatural.
II 228
Limit/Vagueness/definiteness-Operator/Field: We need the definiteness-operator ("determined") to characterize a certain limit from a limit.
II 238
Vagueness/deflationism/Field: "definitive-operator": adds additional conditions to the game under which a statement is definitely true - (s) not merely literal repetition) - referential indeterminacy/(s): then a general sentence only applies to a part - this one is sorted out by the definiteness-operator.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-27