Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Search  
 
Consciousness, philosophy: The experience of differences along with a freedom of choice as opposed to purely automatic responses. See also intentionality, identity theory, other minds.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
McDowell, John
 
Books on Amazon
Consciousness I 113 ff
Confidence/Kant: "I think" that must be able to accompany all my ideas. Temporal continuity. But only formally, otherwise Cartesian.
---
I 113 ff
Definition Person/Locke: "a thinking intelligent being in possession of reason and consideration, and able to consider itself as itself. Even in different places and times.
---
I 126/27
Consciousness/Apperception/Criterion/KantVsLocke: his point (chapter on paralogism): the self-consciousness has nothing to do with a criterion of identity. The subject does not need to make an effort to focus its attention on one and the same thing. ((s) Breathing does not need a criterion for air, important as air may be).
---
I 127
Consciousness/McDowell: to avoid Cartesianism we should not speak of the "flow of consciousness" (stream of consciousness), but of a lasting perspective on something that is itself outside of consciousness.
---
I 128
"I think"/Kant/McDowell: is also a third person whose path through the objective world results in a substantial continuity. (Evans, Strawson, paralogisms).
---
I 129f
McDowellVsKant: it is unsatisfactory if consciousness is to be only the continuity of one aspect, one perspective without a body. The notion of ​​continuity cannot be conceived without the notion of ​​the living thing - as little as digestion. But that is not to say that physical presence is always connected with a self-consciousness.
Consciousness/Kant: only creatures with conceptual skills have self-consciousness. McDowell pro.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001


> Counter arguments against McDowell



> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX file
 
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29