Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Consciousness, philosophy: The experience of differences along with a freedom of choice as opposed to purely automatic responses. See also intentionality, identity theory, other minds.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Strawson, Peter F.
Books on Amazon
Consciousness I 114
Consciousness/Strawson: why do we attribute it to a subject at all? - Why do we always atribute our experiences to the same subject? - Descartes: body plays a unique role for everyone - I 115 Strawson face experiences depend on three things: 1) whether eyes opened, 2) where directed, 3) position of the body E.g. subject with three bodies: whether eyelids of A and B open irrelevant for whether C can see something ... - I 119 Possession of my body does not explain my concept of self
I 120f
Consciousness/Strawson: Descartes/Wittgenstein: both: attribution to body is a linguistic deception. 1) Descartes: "Person" refers to two very different substances, with types of states which are mutually exclusive - 2) Wittgenstein: "It thinks" (Strawson: ditto)
I 127
Consciousness/Self/I/Strawson: attributing states of consciousness and experiences to ourselves is a necessary condition: for attributing them also to others - Basis: notion of a class of predicates which require distinct individuals to whom they can be attributed - I 129 other individuals must be identified +through body, not merely as carriers of consciousness - but this is not a simple refutation of Descartes, because s already presupposes that I have found a simple relation between my experiences and body M, which I'm still looking for
I 147
Consciousness/Strawson: pointless to speak of a single consciousness
I 171
Consciousness/Strawson: only possible as a secondary, non-basic particular

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik M√ľnchen 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29